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Soliman v. Commissioner: Recent Changes in
the Tax Court's Treatment of the
Home Office Deduction
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although many occupations require some work to be done at
home, most people recognize that this alone does not entitle them
to a tax deduction for the expenses attributable to their home offices. In fact, the deductibility of home office expenses is a complex
matter that is currently the subject of a major controversy between
the courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Section 280A(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides,
as a general rule, that no deduction shall be allowed with respect to
the use of a taxpayer's residence.' An exception to the general
rule, section 280A(c), permits the deduction of home office expenses if a portion of the home is used exclusively on a regular
basis as the taxpayer's principal place of business; a place where
the taxpayer meets with patients, clients, or customers in connection with his business; or is a separate structure unattached to his
residence. This Note focuses on the first of these conditions:
namely, the principal place of business exception.
Since 1980, the Tax Court has defined a taxpayer's principal
place of business as the place that is the "focal point" of his business activities.2 The "focal point" is defined as the location where
goods and services are provided to customers and revenues are
generated. Although the Tax Court has applied the focal point
test consistently, the circuit courts have reversed the Tax Court's
findings under this test on three occasions.4 In each of these cases,
the circuit courts emphasized the significant amount of the taxpayer's total working time spent at home.'
1. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1988).
2. Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109 (1980).
3. See Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 613-14 (1982); Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696, 700 (1981); Bale, 74 T.C. at 109.
4. Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner,
751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); Drucker, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); see also infra text
accompanying notes 40-62.
5. Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79 ("a major consideration ought to be the length of time the
taxpayer spends in the home office"); Weissman, 751 F.2d at 517 (eighty percent of each
working week spent at home office); Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69 (more than half of work
week spent at home office).
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In Soliman v. Commissioner,6 the Tax Court responded to these
appellate decisions by severely limiting the applicability of the focal
point test and broadening its interpretation of a principal place of
business. The court held that the principal place of business test
can be met when: (1) a taxpayer's home office is essential to his
business; (2) the taxpayer spends substantial time there; and (3)
there is no other location available in which to perform the office
functions of the taxpayer's business.7
The IRS responded swiftly to Soliman by issuing an information
release stating that it will not follow the Tax Court's decision.'
The IRS cautioned taxpayers not to rely on the decision, proclaiming that the opinion is contrary to the law and creates an unclear
standard. 9
This Note analyzes the Tax Court's decision in Soliman and discusses potential problems with the court's interpretation of the
principal place of business exception. First, this Note provides a
brief overview of the tests that the Tax Court previously has used
to determine the deductibility of home office expenses. Next, in the
context of these decisions, it provides a critical analysis of the
court's opinion in Soliman and identifies specific weaknesses in its
rationale. Finally, this Note proposes an objective test in which
the time spent and the nature of the activities performed at the
home office are compared to the time spent at other business locations to determine whether a taxpayer's home office is the taxpayer's principal place of business.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Enactment and Early Interpretation of Section 280A

Deductions are a matter of legislative grace.10 As such, Congress has granted taxpayers deductions for their business expenses,1 and denied similar deductions for personal living
expenses.' 2 This seemingly simple dichotomy between business
and personal expenses is complicated when a taxpayer uses part of
6. 94 T.C. 20 (1990).
7. Id. at 29.
8. I.R.S. News Release IR-90-55 (March 27, 1990).
9. Id. The IRS filed a motion for reconsideration of the opinion, which was denied
on April 13, 1990.
10. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 3621 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
11. I.R.C. § 162 (1988) (allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business").
12. Id. § 262(a) ("except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses").
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his residence for business purposes. In accordance with its overall
scheme of disallowing deductions, Congress generally has viewed
home office expenses as personal, unless the taxpayer can satisfy
certain statutory provisions.
Prior to the enactment of section 280A, deductions for home
office expenses were governed by sections 162' 3 and 16714 of the
Code. Pursuant to these sections, and within the constraints of
section 262,'1 the Tax Court formerly permitted a deduction for
home office expenses if the home office was "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer in performing his duties.' 6 Under this standard, home office deductions were permitted if the home office was
more practical than the work7 office, even when the employer provided a suitable work office.'
Predictably, this liberal standard for distinguishing business and
personal use soon engendered attempts by taxpayers to deduct personal living expenses under the guise of ordinary and necessary
business expenses.18 In response, the Tax Court recognized the superiority of the section 262 disallowance provision over section 162
and refined the appropriate and helpful standard. In Sharon v.
Commissioner,'9 the court stated that, after determining whether
expenses were appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's employment, it then had to balance all the facts in the case, and disallow
any expenses that were essentially personal or merely for the con13. Id. § 162; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14. Id. § 167(a) (provides for a deduction for the exhaustion, wear, and tear of property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income).
15. Id. § 262; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1970). In Newi, the taxpayer was a salesman of television time who maintained an
area in his apartment that he used exclusively for viewing television advertisements, reviewing notes, and studying various research materials and ratings for approximately
three hours per night. The appellate court affirmed the Tax Court's allowance of the
taxpayer's home office deduction as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The
court also reasoned that the maintenance of the office was "appropriate and helpful" to
the taxpayer's business and returning to his work office at night would have been impractical. Newi, 432 F.2d at 1000.
17. Id.
18. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820
(1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Bodzin was
an attorney who maintained an office in his home, although his work office was available
and nearby. The Tax Court allowed the deduction under the appropriate and helpful
standard. The appellate court reversed and held that the expense was a personal expense,
which was nondeductible pursuant to section 262. Bodzin, 509 F.2d at 681.
19. 66 T.C. 515, 525 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978) (with
facts very similar to those in Bodzin, the Tax Court disallowed the deduction based on a
finding that the expenses were essentially personal).
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venience of the taxpayer.20
Congress reacted to the uncertainty in the classification of home
and business expenses by enacting section 601 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976,21 which added section 280A to the Code. Section
280A provides as a general rule that home office expenses are not
deductible, except to the extent that they are specifically permitted
within that section.22 Section 280A(c)(1) designates three exceptions to this rule of nondeductibility. 23 Pursuant to these exceptions, home office expenses are deductible if a portion of the home
is used exclusively on a regular basis as: (1) the principal place of
business of the taxpayer;24 (2) a place where the taxpayer meets
with patients, clients, or customers; or (3) a separate structure unattached to the taxpayer's residence.
Section 280A effectively rejected the Tax Court's appropriate
and helpful test by restricting the deductibility of home office expenses to three discrete exceptions and eliminating any consideration of the taxpayer's convenience. This stricter standard for the
deductibility of home office expenses was intended to prevent what
Congress considered to be the widespread deduction of otherwise
nondeductible personal living expenses, simply because the taxpayer performed some portion of his business activities in his per20. Sharon, 66 T.C. at 524-25.
21. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 280A
(1988)).
22. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1988).
23. Specifically, this section provides:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to
a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling
unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his
employer.
Id. § 280A (c)(l).
24. As originally enacted, section 280A(c)(1)(A) read "as the taxpayer's principal
place of business." I.R.C. § 280A (c)(l)(A) (1988). The Tax Court interpreted this language as indicating that a taxpayer could have more than one principal place of business
if he had more than one trade or business. Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766
(1980). The IRS expressed its disagreement with the court's decision stating that a taxpayer could only have one principal place of business. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-30-024 (1980).
Congress settled this debate in favor of the Tax Court by amending section 280A(c)(1)(A)
to its current form. Pub. L. No. 97-119, § 113, 95 Stat. 1635, 1642 (1981).
25. See I.R.C. § 280A (c)(l) (1988).
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sonal residence.26 Congress expected that section 280A would
provide the courts and taxpayers with definitive rules in order to
resolve the conflict that existed between the courts' decisions under
the appropriate and helpful test and the IRS's more conservative
position as to the correct standard governing the deductibility of
expenses attributable to the business use of a taxpayer's residence.27
Despite this stated objective, Congress failed to provide any guidance as to the scope of the phrase "principal place of business" as
used in section 280A(c)(1)(A).
B.

The Focal Point Test

In Baie v. Commissioner,2 the Tax Court responded to Congress's omission by developing the "focal point" test to determine
the location of a taxpayer's principal place of business. 29 In Baie,
the taxpayer operated a food stand less than a mile from her
home.30 As her business expanded, she required more space to prepare her products than the food stand provided.31 Consequently,
she used space in her kitchen at home to prepare, store, and package food for her business.3 2 In addition, the taxpayer used a second bedroom in her home exclusively for office space. 33 The Tax
Court disallowed her home office deduction because it found the
stand, not the home office, to be the focal point of her activities.34
The court noted that the sale of the food was what generated income, and these sales occurred at the food stand, not at her
home.35
The focal point is the place where goods or services are provided
to customers or clients, and where income is produced. 6 The
number of hours spent on various activities and in different loca26. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, 147 (1976).
27. Id.
28. 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
29. [N]othing in the legislative history of section 280A or the Commissioner's
regulations furnishes any guidance as to the scope of the 'principal place of
business' concept in the context of section 280A. We therefore take it that what
Congress had in mind was the focal point of a taxpayer's activities ....
Id. at 109.
30. Id. at 106.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id. at 110.
36. Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 612-14 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1983).
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tions is not controlling in determining the taxpayer's focal point.3 7
Although the Tax Court consistently has applied the focal point
test in evaluating the deductibility of home office expenses,38 on
three occasions appellate courts have reversed the Tax Court's denial of the deductions.39
In the first of these cases, Drucker v. Commissioner,40 the taxpayer was a concert musician with the New York Metropolitan
Opera (Met) who used a room in his apartment exclusively as a
practice studio for thirty hours per week. 4 ' The Met did not provide the taxpayer with a practice area, and practice was essential to
maintaining his position with the Met.42 The Tax Court found the
Met auditorium, where performances were held, to be the focal
point of the taxpayer's activities and consequently disallowed the
taxpayer's home deductions. 43 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's finding and held that his home studio was the focal point of his employment-related activities, based
on the time and importance of the taxpayer's activities there."
Subsequently, in Weissman v. Commissioner,45 the Second Circuit solidified its stance and elaborated on Drucker's criticism of
the focal point test. Weissman was a professor at the City University of New York. In addition to teaching, meeting with students,
and grading examinations, Weissman was required to do an "unspecified amount" of research and writing in order to retain his
teaching position.46 Because the office that the university provided
to him was unsuitable, Weissman maintained an office at his apartment, which he used exclusively for work-related research and
writing. 47 He spent eighty percent of each working week at his
37. See Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428, 433 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1983); Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696, 700 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Lopkoff v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 256, 258 (1982) (focal
point of Veterans Administration administrative assistant is hospital); Trussel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 190, 191-92 (1982) (focal point of judge is the courtroom);
Moskovit v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 859 (1982) (focal point of teacher is
school).
39. See Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1983).
40. 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 68.
42. Id. at 69.
43. Drucker, 79 T.C. at 613.
44. Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69. The court noted that less than half of the taxpayer's
working time was spent at the auditorium. Id.
45. 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
46. Id. at 513 (quoting Weissman, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, 521 (1983)).
47. Id.
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home office.4 8 The Tax Court applied the focal point test and
found that the school was Weissman's principal place of business.4 9
The Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's use of the focal
point test and held that Weissman's home office was his principal
place of business, based on the time spent and the importance of
the activities performed there.50
The court found that, although the focal point test may be helpful in many cases, it is not appropriate in all cases. Specifically,
when a taxpayer's occupation involves two very distinct yet related
activities, such as practice and performance or writing and teaching, the focal point approach creates a risk of shifting attention to
the place where a taxpayer's work is more visible, instead of the
place where the "dominant portion" of his work is accomplished. 5 '
The court stated that in each case the determination of a taxpayer's
principal place of business depends on three factors: (1) the nature
of his business activities; (2) the attributes of the space in which
these activities can be conducted; and (3) the practical
necessity of
52
using a home office to carry out these activities.
In Meiers v. Commissioner,5 3 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals echoed the sentiments expressed by the Second Circuit in
Weissman and Drucker, and rejected the application of the focal
point test. In Meiers, the taxpayer, Meiers, owned and operated a
self-service laundromat5 4 As manager of the laundromat, she retained five part-time employees to assist customers. 5 Meiers's responsibilities consisted of collecting money from machines, filling
change machines, maintaining books and records, and drafting
work schedules.5 6 She spent approximately one hour each day at
the laundromat and two hours a day at a home office that she used
solely for her business.57 The Tax Court held that the laundromat,
not the home office, was the focal point of Meiers's activities and
consequently disallowed the deduction of her home office
expenses. 58
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court and permitted the
48.

Id.

49. Weissman, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 522.
50. Weissman, 751 F.2d at 516.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 514-15.
53.

782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 76.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 79.
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deduction.59 The appellate court stated that the focal point test is
not fair to taxpayers and fails to carry out Congress's apparent intent in enacting section 280A in the most appropriate way. 60 The
court noted that Meiers spent most of her time in her home office;
it considered
this an important factor in determining deductibility.61 The court stated, however, that this indicator is not necessarily dispositive, but is weighed with other factors, such as the
importance of the business functions performed at home, the business necessity of maintaining a home office, and the taxpayer's expenditures in establishing a home office.62
Not all circuits, however, have rejected the focal point test. In a
recent case, Pomarantz v. Commissioner,63 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's holding that denied the taxpayer a home office deduction based on the focal point test.
Pomarantz was a physician who spent thirty-three to thirty-six
hours per week at one hospital. 64 Approximately one-half of that
time was spent treating patients; the remainder was spent completing charts, following up on patient care, reading, and writing.65
Although he had access to a shared work area at the hospital, he
had no private office there.66 Pomarantz maintained a home office,
which he used to write, read medical journals, and keep business
records and patient charts. 67 He spent 150-250 hours per year in
his home office and, on average, spent more time per week at the
hospital than at home.6 s
The appellate court affirmed the denial of Pomarantz's home office deduction, based on its finding that the Tax Court's decision
was not clearly erroneous. 69 The court noted the tests applied by
the Second and Seventh Circuits,70 but stated, without adopting
59. Id.
60. Id. Congress hoped to provide "definitive rules" relating to home office deductions and to preclude the deduction of nondeductible personal expenses as business expenses. SEN. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, 147 (1976).
61. Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79.
62. Id.
63. 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Id at 495.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id. at 495-96.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 497. The court explained its application of the clearly erroneous standard
of review by stating that the determination of a principal place of business was essentially
factual, and that the expertise of the Tax Court warranted deference. Id.
70. Although these courts articulated their standards slightly differently, both courts
focused on the time spent at the home office and the importance of the activities performed there. See Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79; Weissman, 751 F.2d at 514.
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any specific standard for itself, that it was satisfied that
Pomarantz's home office did not qualify as his principal place of
business under any of the tests.7 The court noted that the essential
income-generating activity of his business was the hands-on treatment of patients, which he did only at the hospital, and not the
studying or writing that he did at home.72
Although the Ninth Circuit explicitly avoided the issue of the
focal point test, its extreme deference to the Tax Court could be
read as a tacit acceptance of that test. When viewed in light of the
Second and Seventh Circuits' explicit rejection of the focal point
test, Pomarantz accentuates the uncertainty surrounding the deductibility of home office expenses.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Majority Opinion
In Soliman v. Commissioner,73 the Tax Court reevaluated its focal point test and attempted to reconcile the appellate court decisions by adopting a new standard to determine whether a
taxpayer's home office is his principal place of business. Soliman
was an anesthesiologist who worked at three different hospitals. 74
He earned income by administering anesthesia to patients before
surgery, caring for patients immediately after surgery, and treating
patients for pain. 75 He spent thirty to thirty-five hours per week at
the three hospitals, with eighty percent of that time spent at one of
the hospitals.76 Soliman did not have an office at any of the
hospitals.77
Soliman used a spare bedroom of his three bedroom apartment
as an office, where he kept office furniture, a filing cabinet, patient
records, billing records, correspondence with patients, names of
surgeons and insurance companies, medical journals and texts, and
collection agency records. 78 In his office, Soliman made businessrelated telephone calls, contacted hospitals to arrange for admission of his patients, maintained billing records, read medical books
and journals, and prepared for specific patients.79 He spent two to
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Pomarantz, 867 F.2d at 497.
Id. at 497-98.
94 T.C. 20 (1990).
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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three hours each day in his home office, but never treated patients
there.8I. Soliman attempted to deduct the expenses attributable to
his home office pursuant1 to section 280A(c)(1)(A), but the IRS dis8
allowed the deduction.
The Tax Court concluded specifically that Soliman's home office
was not the focal point of his activities, since it was not the site
where goods or services were provided to customers and income
was generated. 2 In addition, the court stated that, although
Soliman's home office activities were essential to his medical practice, they were ancillary to the primary income-generating services
that he performed at the hospitals.83 Despite these findings, the
court disagreed with the IRS and permitted the deduction.".
The Soliman court held that it will no longer apply the focal
point test when: (1) a taxpayer's home office is essential to his
business; (2) he spends substantial time there; and (3) there is no
other location available to perform the office functions of his business.8 - In such cases, the court will look to the "facts and circumstances" to determine whether the home office is the principal
place of business under section 280A.16
The Soliman court explained its rejection of the focal point test
by observing, that in addition to the "principal place of business"
exception,8 7 Congress provided an exception to the general rule of
nondeductibility by allowing deductions for home office expenses if
the office was used for meeting patients, clients, or customers.88
Because the requirements of the focal point test can only be
achieved if the taxpayer meets with customers or clients in his
home, the court reasoned that the focal point test has the practical
effect of merging the principal place of business exception into the
meeting clients exception. 9 Thus, the court found that, if the principal place of business exception is to have meaning independent of
the meeting clients exception, the focal point test should give way
to an analysis of all the facts and circumstances in order to deter80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
29.
(1982)

Id
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) (1980).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id
Id at 26.
I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) (1988).
Id. § 280A(c)(1)(B).
Soliman, 94 T.C. at 25; see also Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 623
(Wilbur, J., dissenting).
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mine most accurately the taxpayer's principal place of business. 9°
The Tax Court further stated that time spent in the home office
is an important consideration, but not necessarily the predominant
factor, in assessing deductibility under section 280A. 9 ' The court
asserted that although Soliman spent more time at the hospitals
than at his home office, this time comparison was misleading because the activities performed at the locations were different. 92 In
support of its position, the court cited proposed regulations that
permit principal place of business treatment for home offices of
salespeople who have no other office space and spend substantial
time at their home offices. 93
The Tax Court distinguished its decision in Pomarantz v. Commissioner, which it described as only "superficially similar" to
Soliman. 94 The court stated that the taxpayer in Pomarantz spent
an insubstantial amount of time in his home office. 9" In contrast,
Soliman spent thirty percent of his working time in his home office,
96
which the court considered a significant differentiating factor.
B.

The Dissenting Opinions

Judge Nims dissented from the opinion of the majority and
stated that he would deny Soliman's home office deduction based
on the focal point test. 97 Judge Nims noted that in the three cases
in which appellate courts had reversed Tax Court decisions under
the focal point test, the most important factors in the reversals
were the time spent and the importance of the work performed at
the home office. 98 He asserted that each of those cases involved
unusual situations in which, despite the unfavorable result of the
focal point test, the taxpayer's true focal point was his home
90. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 25. The court stated that a principal place of business is not
necessarily where goods and services are transferred to clients or customers, but is frequently the administrative headquarters of a business. Id. The court explicitly found
that Soliman's medical practice was headquartered at his home office. Id. at 29.
91. Id. at 26.
92. Id. The court added that a time comparison can be meaningful only if the activities in the home office are similar to the activities at another place of business. Id.
93. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980) (as amended at 48
Fed. Reg. 33320 (1983)). The court recognized that proposed regulations do not have the
force of law, but nevertheless regarded them as a considered opinion of the Secretary of
the Treasury. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 27.
94. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 27.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 32-33 (Nims, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Nims, C.J., dissenting).
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office."
In addition, Judge Nims commented that the majority's adoption of a "facts and circumstances" inquiry has the undesirable effect of returning the court to the situation that existed before
Congress took what it hoped would be the remedial action of enacting section 280A.100 Judge Nims opined that, in effect, the majority has substituted the phrase "important place of business" for
the phrase "principal place of business."' 0 1
In a companion dissenting opinion, Judge Ruwe also took issue
with the majority's decision.10 2 Judge Ruwe would have denied
Soliman's home office deduction and adopted the test employed by
the Second and Seventh Circuits, which identifies a taxpayer's
principal place of business as the place where the "dominant portion" of his work is accomplished. 0 3 Judge Ruwe emphasized that
a taxpayer can have only one principal place of business for each
business in which he is engaged. When a taxpayer has two or more
places of conducting business, the court must compare the importance of the activities performed and the time spent at the locations
to determine which site constitutes the taxpayer's principal place of
business. '"
Judge Ruwe harshly criticized the majority for taking what he
considered the highly unusual step of overruling precedent in the
Tax Court on the basis of appellate court opinions and then disregarding the test articulated by those same appellate courts. 10 5 He
pointed to the court's fundamentally different treatment of the crucial consideration of time spent at each location.1 °" More specifically, Judge Ruwe noted that the majority's position, that a
comparison of the time spent at the home office and the time spent
at the other place of business cannot be meaningful if the activities
performed at the locations are of different types, is inconsistent
with the Second Circuit's holding in Weissman v. Commissioner."7
He stated that Professor Weissman's campus activities were not
similar to his home office activities, yet the appellate court specifi99. Id. (Nims, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Nims, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 33 (Nims, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 34 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 35 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 41 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 35 (Ruwe, J.,dissenting).
107. Id. at 36 (Ruwe, J., dissenting) (citing Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1984)); see also supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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cally compared the time spent at the two locations.' ° 8
In addition, Judge Ruwe was not swayed by the majority's distinction of Pomarantz.109 He noted that, contrary to the majority's
contention, neither the Tax Court nor the Ninth Circuit found the
time spent by Pomarantz at his home office to be insubstantial.' 10
In fact, the Tax Court found that, in certain weeks, Pomarantz
actually spent more time at his home office than at the hospital. In
light of these facts, Judge Ruwe found Pomarantzindistinguishable
from Soliman. "I
Judge Ruwe concluded his dissent by reminding the court that,
although it may seem unfair to deny deductions for home office
expenses that are essential to a taxpayer's business, deductions are
a matter of legislative grace and there is simply no provision for
deduction of expenses that are "essential" or "substantial."' 1 2 He
noted that when Congress enacted section 280A it certainly was
aware that, along with the intended result of providing definitive
rules and alleviating administrative burdens, section 280A would
also deny deductions to some taxpayers despite the business necessity of their home offices.' 13 This result, however, does not empower the Tax Court to disregard a specific, albeit sometimes
harsh, statutory restriction on the deductibility of home office
expenses. 11
C.

Soliman's Aftermath

The tenor of the dissenting opinions foreshadowed the IRS's reaction to Soliman. In a highly,, unusual public statement three
months after the decision, the IRS announced that it would not
follow the Tax Court's ruling in Soliman."I5 The IRS warned taxpayers not to rely on the decision and indicated that it had filed a
motion for reconsideration with the Tax Court. 1 6 IRS officials
noted the strong dissenting opinions in the case and stated that the
108. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 36 (Ruwe, J., dissenting). Judge Ruwe also noted that, in
Meiers, the Seventh Circuit clearly found that the taxpayer's activities at her home office
and at the laundry were different, but of equal importance; therefore, the comparison of
the time spent at the respective places became the deciding factor. Id. n.3 (Ruwe, J.,
dissenting).
109. Id. at 40 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 41 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
115. I.R.S. News Release IR-90-55 (Mar. 27, 1990).
116. Id. The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1990.
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opinion is contrary to legislative intent and creates an unclear
117
standard.
Although it is clear that the IRS's concerns run deeper than simply preserving congressional intent, its strong public reaction to
Soliman indicates serious problems in the court's decision.' 18 Indeed, it is no small detail that by rejecting the focal point test, the
court effectively overruled ten years of precedent and opened up
the potential for home office deductions to "gadzillions" of
taxpayers. 119

A.

IV; ANALYSIS
Soliman's Lack of Wisdom

Soliman's majority opinion is well-founded to the extent that it
rejects the focal point test for determining a taxpayer's principal
place of business. As the court correctly pointed out, this test
merges the principal place of business exception into the meeting
clients exception, and essentially eliminates the principal place of
business exception from section 280A. t20 Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of a scenario under which a home office could satisfy the
focal point test's requirement that goods or services be transferred
to customers or clients at the home office, and not simultaneously
satisfy the exception accorded taxpayers who meet clients, customers, or patients at the home office.' 21 This overlapping of exceptions clearly was Congress's intent in enacting section 280A.
The Tax Court's new test, however, also fails to accommodate
the congressional intent to proyide definitive rules governing the
deductibility of home office expenses. By holding that a taxpayer's
home office can be considered his principal place of business when
117. The IRS is in favor of retaining the focal point test. Id.
118. Significantly, the Tax Court does not intend to retreat from its decision in
Soliman. Indeed, in a decision filed on the very same day as.Soliman, the court applied
the Soliman test in favor of another taxpayer. Kahaku v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1247 (1990). In Kahaku, the taxpayer was a professional guitarist who maintained a home office that he used exclusively for his business as a musician. Kahaku
practiced thirty hours per week in his home office and maintained his business records
there. He performed eight to twelve hours per week in a restaurant during the years in
question. Kahaku deducted his automobile depreciation and expenses on business trips
between his home office, the restaurant, music stores, and audition sites. Judge Nims
wrote the majority opinion which found, under the facts and circumstances inquiry set
out in Soliman, that Kahaku's home office was his principle place of business and accordingly allowed the deductions. Id. at 1249.
119. Stout, IRS Warns It Opposes Tax Ruling, Wall St. J., March 28, 1990, at 1, col.
3.
120. Soliman v Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 25 (1990).
121. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) (1988).
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it is essential to his business, he spends substantial time there, and
there is no other location available to perform the office functions
of his business, the Soliman court distorted the plain meaning of
the statutory phrase "principal place of business" into something
closer to "essential place of business." In fact, this return to a
"facts and circumstances" inquiry blatantly
frustrates Congress's
22
stated purpose in enacting section 280A.
The primary weakness in the majority's new approach is that it
focuses exclusively on the taxpayer's home office without undertaking any comparison with the taxpayer's other places of business.
The statute mandates that a deduction will be allowed if the taxpayer's home office is his principal place of business. 123 The word
"principal" requires a comparison between the taxpayer's home office and any other place where the taxpayer conducts a particular
trade or business. The Soliman test, however, ignores this fact.
For example, if one slightly alters the language of the test, by substituting "place of business" for "home office,"'124 both the hospital
where Soliman spent the majority of his time and his home office
would qualify as his principal place of business. Clearly, the
Soliman test is incongruous with the plain meaning of the statutory
language.
Another failing in the court's new scheme is that it does not
provide for any analysis of the types of activities performed at the
home office. The court implies that the type of activity is irrelevant. Instead, the court focuses on whether the activity performed
at the home office is essential to the taxpayer's business. Many
activities are essential to the operation of a business for profit, but
this fact alone cannot convert the locale of the performance of an
activity into one's principal place of business. In the present case,
Soliman's home office activities consisted primarily of administrative tasks. Although these tasks may have been essential to the
maintenance of his medical practice, they certainly were not income-generating. When no income-generating activities are performed at the home office, it would be absurd to conclude that the
home office is the principal place of business.
122. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 33 (Nims, J., dissenting); S.REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 144, 147 (1976).
123. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) (1988).
124. The test would then state: "Where a taxpayer's [place of business] is essential to
his business, he spends substantial time there and there is no other location available to
perform the functions performed at that [place of business], the court will consider all of
the facts and circumstances to determine whether the [place of business] is his principal
place business." See Soliman, 94 T.C. at 26, 29.
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Furthermore, the court's new approach is too ambiguous to provide any guidance to taxpayers. By using the word "substantial"
to describe the amount of time a taxpayer must spend at his home
office, the court has compounded the uncertainty of its new standard. This fact was illustrated aptly by the court's cursory distinction of the time spent by Pomarantz in his home office compared to
the time spent by Soliman. 25 By simply stating in a conclusory
fashion that one was substantial and the other was not, the court
demonstrated the discretionary nature of its substantial time requirement. The inevitable result of this nebulous approach is that
the case law interpreting the standard will be inconsistent. Consequently, taxpayers will be unable to determine with any confidence
whether their home office expenses are deductible.
Similarly, Judge Ruwe's criticisms of the majority, although
well-founded, also fail to suggest a workable alternative. Judge
Ruwe proposed that the court adopt the tests used by the Second
and Seventh Circuits, which essentially call for a determination of
where the "dominant portion" of the taxpayer's work is accomplished. This is a comparative approach, taking into consideration
the time spent at the home office, the importance of the business
functions performed at home, the business necessity of maintaining
a home office, and the taxpayer's expenditures to establish the
home office. 1 26 Although these are relevant factors that should be
considered in identifying a taxpayer's principal place of business,
the application of this standard still entails a case-by-case balancing of facts and circumstances. Practically, the factors that the
court will consider are all that differentiate Judge Ruwe's test and
the majority's test. Both tests, however, contravene the congressional intent of providing definitive rules for this deduction and
serve to reintroduce the facts and circumstances inquiry that existed before Congress took the remedial action of enacting section
280A.
B. Proposal
It is apparent from Soliman and its predecessors, that the IRS,
the courts, and taxpayers would benefit from an objective test to
determine a taxpayer's principal place of business under section
280A. An objective test would promote the stated congressional
intent of providing definitive rules for the deductibility of home
125. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96, 109-11.
126. Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1984).
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office expenses, provide predictability in the application of the deduction provision, and alleviate the administrative burden on the
IRS and the courts. To be consistent with section 280A, the test
should employ a comparative approach to its examination of the
home office, and the results should comport with the common understanding of the phrase "principal place of business."
This proposal satisfies both of these objectives. The time spent
at the home office and the nature of the business activities performed at the home office are the focus of this two branch test. 127
Under the first branch of this proposed test, the amount of time
that the taxpayer spends at the home office is compared to the aggregate time spent at all other places of business. If the taxpayer
spends the majority of his total work time at his home office, the
home office is his principal place of business. If this is the case,
there is no need to continue on to the second branch of the test.
This initial branch of the proposed test reflects the overall importance of time as a factor in identifying a principal place of business,
as well as the practical reality that a taxpayer who spends the majority of his work time at his home office is generally considered to
be "working out of his home."
If the taxpayer spends less than a majority of total work time at
his home office, then, under the second branch of the test, the taxpayer's home office activities are examined more closely. Specifically, the second branch of the proposed test focuses only on home
office activities that are "income-generating." 12 The purpose of
this restriction is to eliminate the section 280A deduction for those
taxpayers who maintain home offices primarily for their own convenience. In addition, by limiting the analysis of time spent at the
home office in this way, the comparison of home office time with
time spent at other individual business locations will not lend itself
to manipulation by taxpayers.
127. The time spent at the home office and the importance of the activities performed
there are the two most significant factors considered by the Second and Seventh Circuits.
See supra text accompanying notes 44, 50, 62.
128. The performance of income-generating activities traditionally has been considered important in identifying a principal place of business. Although Soliman rejected
the focal point test, neither the Soliman court nor the Second and Seventh Circuits expressly criticized the second prong of the focal point test, which includes within its definition the site where income is generated. Furthermore, this aspect of the focal point test
did not contribute to what the majority found to be its fatal flaw: namely, the merging of
the principal place of business and the meeting clients exceptions. The classification of
home office activities as income or nonincome-generating serves to assess objectively the
"importance" of the activities performed at the home office as emphasized by the Second
and Seventh Circuits.
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For the purpose of this branch of the proposed test, income-generating activities are those that result directly in compensation to
the taxpayer, such as the sale of goods or the performance of services."' In addition, home office activities which are inextricably
linked to the primary income-generating activity of the taxpayer,
such as preparing food to be sold or practicing for paid performances, are also considered income-generating for the purpose of
this test. 130 However, purely administrative activities, such as billing, maintaining records, or corresponding with clients or patients,
are not income-generating. In addition, activities performed primarily to enhance or to improve the taxpayer's performance of income-generating activities, such as reading medical journals, are
not income-generating activities. Note that although an activity
may be essential, it is not necessarily income-generating.
Once the taxpayer's home office activities have been categorized
in this manner, the percentage of the taxpayer's working time spent
at his home office performing income-generating activities must be
determined. Finally, the time spent at the home office performing
income-generating activities is compared to the time spent at each
of the taxpayer's other business locations in order to determine
whether the home office qualifies as the principal place of business.
There are three possibilities under this inquiry.
First, if the taxpayer spends more time at any one business location than the income-generating time that he spends at his home
office, then the home office will not be considered his principal
place of business for the purpose of section 280A. This result
would be applicable in a case such as Soliman; Soliman's activities
in his home office were not income-generating, 31 and he spent approximately twenty-eight hours per week at one hospital.
Soliman's home office, therefore, was not his principal place of
business under the proposed test.
129. Note that an occupation may consist of more than one income-generating activity. Such activities are not necessarily the most visible activities of a taxpayer. For example, if a professor is employed by a university to teach classes as well as write and publish
an unspecified amount of material, the research and writing activities would constitute
income-generating activities.
130. See supra text accompanying note 126. In this regard, it is helpful to think of
income-generating activities as analogous to billable, as opposed nonbillable, time for a
professional. For example, an attorney reading a law journal article for general informational purposes would not be performing an income-generating activity, just as reading
the article would not be billable. However, if the attorney were reading the article in the
course of research for a specific client matter, this would be an income-generating activity, just as it would be billable to the client.
131. His home office activities consisted of administrative tasks and reading medical
journals. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 21-22 (1990).
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Second, if the taxpayer spends more income-generating time at
his home office than at each other business location, his home office
will be considered his principal place of business. For example,
assume that the taxpayer is a plumber whose only office is his home
office, which he maintains to perform administrative tasks and receive phone calls requesting his services. The time spent receiving
phone calls is income-generating, since it entails business solicitation and thus is inextricably linked to the performance of his primary income-generating activity. If the time spent at each other
business location, such as the homes in which he repairs plumbing,
does not exceed the income-generating time in his home office, then
the home office qualifies as his principal place of business.
Third, if the taxpayer spends an equal amount of income-generating time at his home office and at another business location, then
his home office will not be considered his principal place of business. For example, if a taxpayer spends eighteen hours of incomegenerating time at home, eighteen hours at another business location, and four hours at a third location, his home office would not
be his principal place of business. While at first blush this result
presumption
might seem harsh, it is consistent with the statutory
1 32
expenses.
office
home
of
against the deductibility
As with any objective standard, this test will in some circumstances seem harsh or unfair. But as Judge Ruwe reminded the
133
majority in Soliman, deductions are a matter of legislative grace,
and Congress did not grant courts the power to allow deductions in
cases that are compelling due to the business necessity of the home
office. Adoption of the proposed standard would enable every taxpayer to determine with certainty whether he was in fact entitled to
a deduction for his home office expenses.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the enactment of section 280A in 1976, courts permitted
taxpayers to deduct ordinary and necessary home office expenses to
the extent that the home office was appropriate and helpful. Section 280A changed this standard by generally denying the deductibility of these expenses, but allowing a deduction when the home
office is the taxpayer's principal place of business. Since 1980, the
Tax Court has identified the taxpayer's principal place of business
as the place where goods and services are provided to customers
132. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1988).
133. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 40 (Ruwe, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying
note 112.
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and revenues are generated. Although the Tax Court applied this
"focal point" test consistently, appellate courts have reversed the
Tax Court's findings under this test on three occasions.
In Soliman v. Commissioner, the Tax Court addressed these appellate court decisions and limited the applicability of the focal
point test. The court held that a home office can be a principal
place of business when it is essential to the taxpayer's business, the
taxpayer spends substantial time there, and there is no other location available to perform the office functions of his business.
This holding fails to adopt the tests suggested by the appellate
courts and does not provide a definitive rule for determining deductibility. Therefore, an objective test should be adopted that
compares the time spent and the nature of the business activities at
the home office with the time spent at other business locations.
Under the test proposed by this Note, home office deductions
would be allowed when the majority of the taxpayer's total work
time is spent at his home office or when the taxpayer spends more
income-generating time at his home office than at any other business location.
KATHLEEN Low

